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The argentinean pension system:
prior and after Reform*
ANGELIKA BUCERIUS**
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1994, Argentina implemented a new pension system,
which was legislated in October 1993. Argentina is the first Latin
American developing country, which implemented a systemic pension
reform1  not by authoritarian rule - like in Chile 1981 - but through
a democratic process (Vittas, 1997, p. 1). Argentina transformed
its former pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme into a mixed
public-private system comprising a PAYG uniform basic pension
* Johann Wolfgang Goethe- Universität, Frankfurt am Main (Germany).
* * A. Diaz Cafferata, Á. Neder y  M. L. Recalde (editors)2003 "Adjusting to
Globalization and Structural Changes in Argentina, Brazil and Germany". Se incluye en
este número con autorización del autor y de los editores.
1 According to Katharina Müller a “substantial paradigm shift in old age security”
qualifies for the term “systemic pension reform“. This was the case in Argentina when
the government introduced a mandatory private old-age provision layer in order to
downsize the public pension layer and to strengthen individual responsibility of the
insured (Müller 2002b, p.1).
2 Contrary to other sources, the notion “layer” is used instead of “pillar”, as “layer”
is more apt to describe the composition of the social security scheme. Social security
schemes normally consist of different layers, some of them are fixed (compulsory), some
of them are variable (voluntary). Pillars may have different heights (per cent of contributions
going to the different layers), implying that the whole social security system is rather out
of balance – even if this is actually not the case.
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as its first layer2 and the choice of either an additional private or
an additional public second layer. The private alternative is based
on individual fully funded (IFF) pension accounts managed mainly
by private fund administrators. The public alternative is financed
on a PAYG basis and organized by the state.
First, the new pension system will be portrayed (Section II).
The next step is to describe the economic and political background
of pension reform (Section III). This is an important basis for the
reasons for reform. However, as Section 4 demonstrates, economic
problems are not the only reason for reform in Argentina. Thus,
there will be a brief summary of the most problematic features of
the old pension scheme (Section IV.1.). It goes to show that
structural deficits of the old pension system were one major cause
for the financial disequilibrium of the old age security system.
Secondly, the most crucial economic - and wherever necessary the
political - framework prior to reform will be analyzed (Section
IV.2.). The last part of this chapter contains demographic projections
until 2050. As pension schemes are created to provide financial
security for the retired, Section V gives attention to the situation
of the pensioners before and after reform. Following this, the
development and current condition of the public and the private
pension schemes will be described (Section VI). Finally, I will sum
up my findings (Section VII).
II. THE 1994 PENSION REFORM AND ITS MAIN FEATURES3
The new Argentine pension system SIJP (Sistema Integrado
de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) was legislated in October 1993 and
began operating in June 1994 (Law 24241). The new Argentine
system is a mixture of the old government-administered PAYG-
system and an individual funded or unfunded retirement account
3 This section is based on Hujo (2001), Queisser (1998) and Vittas (1997).
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program. All public programs are organized and supervised by the
National Social Security Administration (ANSES - Administración
Nacional de Seguridad Social). Private pension funds are
administered by private or public Retirement and Pension Fund
Administrators (AFJPs - Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilacio-
nes y Pensiones). The two layers are intertwined.
II.1. The first layer: The social security scheme
a. Universal Old-age Pensions (PBU)
The first layer remains purely public. It comprises several
different parts for special purposes. First, there is the Universal
Old-age Pensions (PBU - Prestación Básica Universal) which
covers almost every employed persons4. It is financed on a pay-
as-you-go basis. PBU is a defined benefit scheme and provides a
basic pension for all insured who reach retirement age (60 years
for females and 65 years for males) and who have contributed for
at least 30 years to either the old system, the new system or a
combination of the two.
These two factors are the main difference to the old system,
which allowed women to retire with 55 years and men with 60
years. Prior to 1994, just 15 years of contribution were required for
a full pension. By increasing this eligibility criteria, reformers
intended to reduce evasion. Thus, people are required to contribute
for at least 30 years to receive a public pension. However, if this
prerequisite is strictly implemented, people who do not meet the
requirements may fall into poverty. This criteria, conversely, might
have the opposite effect of its very intention: namely, that people
are discouraged to pay their contribution to the pension scheme at
4 Not included are employees of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Ministry, the
Legislative Branch as well as the Judiciary Security personnel.
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all, if the people doubt to be able to contribute for such a long
period.
PBU is financed by a 16 per cent contribution rate on the
worker's salary. It is exclusively levied on employers5. To cover
negative differences between contributions to PBU and expenditures,
the states transfers earmarked taxes and general revenues to the
social security budget. The replacement rate offered by PBU is
supposed to be around 30 per cent. Until 1997, PBU offered 2.5
times of AMPO (Aporte Medio Previsional Obligatorio)6. Yet, since
1997 the flat benefit amounts to 2.5 times of MOPRE (Modulo
Previsional)7. By means of MOPRE, the government annually de-
cides on the amount of retirement payments on the basis of the
budgetary plans. For example, at the end of 1997 one MOPRE
amounted to 80 US-Dollar. As this unit is multiplied by 2.5,
pensioners could receive 200 US-Dollar monthly payment from
PBU. Yet, by substituting AMPO with MOPRE, a discretionary
element was introduced into the public pension scheme (Hujo, 2001).
b. Compensatory Payment (PC - Prestación Compensatoria)
Secondly, the state provides for a Compensatory Payment
(PC) within the first layer. It obliges the government to provide
benefits to people who contributed to the old scheme. The
compensatory pension amounts to 1.5 per cent of the average
indexed wage of the last ten years of employment before retirement.
Eligible for a compensatory payment are those who are entitled for
a basic pension (PBU). Compensatory Payments are financed out
of current contributions and budgetary transfers. There are special
5 The employer’s contribution rate is independent from the employee’s decision
whether he participates in the private or public scheme of the second layer.
6 AMPO related to the contributions assessed on employees and was set two times
each year by dividing total contributions by the number of active contributors. Therefore,
by means of AMPO, pension benefits were linked to average wage, however with a time
lag of six month (Vittas, 1997, p. 44).
7 MOPRE was introduced in 1997 by decree 833/97 as a unit to calculate retirement
benefits.
The Argentinean Pension System - prior and after reform 225
earmarked taxes to fund public transfers. From the governments's
perspective the positive feature of this scheme is its "cashflow
advantage" in comparison to Chile's recognition bonds (Vittas, 1997,
p. 338).
When a new economic crisis set in again in Argentina in the
late 1990s, this design might have been rather fortunate for the
government, as the state was already struggling to pay pensions.
However, it is too early to make a final judgement on whether
compensatory pensions or recognition bonds are better suited for
both the financial situation of the state budget and the pensioners.
The fiscal consequences of these alternative methods are up to
future demographic trends9. For example, if longevity will rise
considerably - as it is predicted in the case of Argentina - the costs
of compensatory pensions are likely to increase. Another drawback
of the Argentinean alternative is that there is no clear break with
the past pension system, like in Chile. Hence, old pension claims
have to be paid much longer after the reform in Argentina (Vittas,
1997, p. 34).
c. Old System Pensions (OSP)
Thirdly, the government provides Old System Pensions (OSP)
to existing beneficiaries. The main problem of OSP is that it transfers
the problems of the old system to the reformed system.
d. Advanced Age Pensions (PEA)
Additionally so-called Advanced Age Pensions (PEA - Pres-
tación por edad avanzada) are granted to people over 70 years
8 In Chile, the total capital sum that workers had accumulated until reform is paid on
retirement. By contrast, in Argentina the payment is distributed over time. Therefore, the
compensation of earlier pension claims takes place gradually. To most observers this had
been a sensible choice, as “[t]his mechanism reflects Argentina’s limited capacity for
additional debt” (Queisser, 1998, p. 16)
9 Additionally, it may well be that there is no first best option. Like social security
systems in general, some designs may work very well in one country but my fail in another
due to different economic, social and political circumstances.
226 Angelika Bucerius
who do not meet the eligibility criteria if they have contributed for
at least 10 years to the pension scheme. PEA was created in order
to prevent the very old people from becoming poor, if they cannot
expect to receive a pension by right.
II.2. The second layer
Every worker is free to choose whether she wants to join
the funded, privatized module or the unfunded public module of the
second layer. All workers must contribute 11 percent of their salary
independently of their choice of either the funded or the unfunded
system. The public alternative is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In the case of the individually fully funded (IFF) alternative, the
contribution rate is split. 3.5 per cent of the salary is deducted to
cover administration fees and also an insurance premiums for
disability and survivorship. The remaining 7.5 per cent of contribution
are capitalised on individual pension accounts10.
a. Public alternative: a Payment for Additional Permanence
(PAP)
The state provides a Additional Payment for Permanence
(PAP - Prestación Adicional por Permanencia) for workers who
prefer to remain under the unfunded system. PAP is a defined
benefit scheme financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. It offers 0.85
per cent of the average indexed salary of the last 10 years of
employment for every service year under the new system. The
maximum replacement rate can be attained after 35 service years
and amounts to 29.75 per cent of average wage.
10 In Argentina, collections of all contributions are centralized and handled by the
General Tax Service (DGI). The very intention of the centralization was to combat evasion
and to contain costs of contribution collection. Yet, this goal has yet not been met, as the
rate of evasion remains high (see Section VI).
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b. Private alternative: Ordinary Pension (JO)
The funded alternative is the so-called Ordinary Pension (JO
- Jubilación Ordinaria) which is administered by Pension Fund
Administrators (AFJP - Administradoras de fondos de Jubilaciones
y Pensiones). The main difference to the public second layer is
that it is an individually fully-funded (IFF) defined-contribution
scheme. As soon as an affiliate reaches retirement age, old-age
pensions are calculated on a strict actuarial basis11.
III. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Pension reform in Argentina was primarily motivated by
short-term considerations. The fiscal deficit was alarmingly high
due to macroeconomic turbulences and structural problems of the
pension scheme. When the state failed to meet the pension claims
in the 1980s, protests within the population popped up and forced
the government to react. Because of these - largely temporary -
necessities, the Argentinean government introduced a pension
reform. Long-term problems like an ageing society because of
declining fertility rates and increasing longevity had already been
expected (see Section IV.3). However, long-term challenges were
not the major motivation of pension reform in Argentina.
The 1994 pension reform has to be seen in the context of grave
economic circumstances and subsequently in the context of overall
economic transformation in the early 1990s. Vittas even saw Argentina
as an example par excellence for the assumption that radical reforms of
social security schemes do not become possible until the old system hits
"rock bottom" in financial terms (Vittas, 1997, p. 41).
11 The insured has to choose from three different pension modes. First, a person can
obtain a life annuity from an insurance company; second, a person may opt for a scheduled
monthly withdrawal; or third, a person can combine both modes.
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III.1. The economic crisis in the late 1980s
The economic crisis in the late 1980s has its roots in
unfortunate economic policies after World War II. State intervention,
restrictions on trade, an exceedingly controlled financial market
and growing political instability were decisive factors for the
slowdown of investment and production. The Argentine industry
became ineffective and unproductive. Furthermore, due to trade
restrictions, exports decreased significantly and thus contributed to
an escalating balance-of-payments crisis. The government tried to
compensate the deficit with austerity policies, which worsened the
situation even more. In the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina experienced
an unprecedented crisis. Negative growth rates of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) highlighted the bad shape of the
Argentinean economy. In 1981, the economic output shrank by
about 6 percent of GDP. In the following years, the situation even
worsened. Four years later, there was a negative growth rate of
7.6 per cent (Table 1). Argentina experienced the worst post-war
annual growth rate in 1989.
Table 1
Annual GDP growth (in % compared to the previous year) in Argentina
(1981 to 1994) selected years
1981 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
GDP growth -5.7 -7.6 -2.6 -7.5 -2.4 12.7 11.9 5.9 5.8
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2001.
Because of the economic crisis, unemployment rose. Still, in
1980 unemployment rates were relatively moderate. However, they
soon rose to 5.9 per cent in 1988, 7.3 per cent one year later and
even 9.3 per cent in 1990 (Table 2). In 1994, there was  a two-
digit unemployment rate (11.7 per cent), despite of the growth of
GDP in the 1990's.
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Table 2
Unemployment (in % of total labour force) in Argentina
 (1980 to 1994); selected years
rates 1981 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Unemployment 2.3 5.3 5.9 7.3 9.2 6.3 7.2 9.1 11.7
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2001.
Taking a closer look at the reasons for this severe economic
performance, two underlying causes can be discovered. Firstly, the
chronic budget deficit, and secondly, high inflation rates.
Table 3
Overall budget deficit(-), superávit (+) including grants (in % of GDP) in Argentina
(1981 to 1994); selected years
1981 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Budget deficit(-)-6.7 -7.9 -5.5 -2.9 -0.4 0.02 0.6 0.7 -0.2
Superavit (+)
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2001.
One major reason for the growing budget deficit were rising
social expenses (Table 4). Rising social expenditures in turn shadow
the economic crisis of the 1980s. Social spending in per cent of
total fiscal spending jumped from 35.4 per cent in 1979 to 54.4 per
cent in 1980. Since then, social spending swallows up more than
half of public expenses.
Table 4
Public social expenditure by category (in % of total public expenditure) in Argentina
 (1979-1993)
1979 1980 1981 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Social
expenditures 35.4 54.4 56.2 57.7 59.5 56.9 56.9 65.2 66.5 68.5 71.6
of which for
Social Security 16.7 21.0 21.8 19.6 21.7 20.4 18.1 25.5 26.4 31.0 33.1
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (1997b).
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As Table 4 shows, the big increase of social expenditure in
1980 was not primarily due to rising expenses on social security12.
Rather, increases in the health budget and expenses for welfare,
housing and employment were the major cause (OECD, 1997b).
However, since then payments for social security in Argentina
rose. In 1993, nearly half of the social budget was needed to cover
social security expenses. At the same time, inflation rates in Ar-
gentina were extremely high for almost two decades. The persistent
and increasing public deficits fuelled inflation even further. Since
1975, there was a three-digit inflation rate. When Argentina returned
to constitutional democracy in 1983, people were free to speak up
again. The people urged the government to control inflation. The
government was forced to react and launched four successive
stabilization programs. However, every single one of them failed to
reduce inflation, because they did not succeed in diminishing the
structural and the resulting financial deficit of the public sector.
Rather, inflation increased even further. In 1988, the inflation rate
mounted to an annual rate of 343 per cent. In 1989, the price rise
peaked at 3079 per cent (Table 5). The two traumatic hyperinflations
in 1989 and 1990 contributed to the awareness that overall economic
reform was needed. This included reforms in the pension scheme
as well.
Table 5
Annual inflation of consumer prices (in % of the previous year) in Argentina
(1970-1994)
1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Inflation 182.9 100.8 672.2 343 3,079 2,314 171.7 24.9 10.6 4.2
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2001.
12 Social security largely comprises all pension payments (i.e. old age, invalidity,
survivorship).
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III.2. Economic reforms under Menem since 1989
The Argentinean economy is facing negative growth rates,
high rates of unemployment and accelerating inflation rates again.
Yet, the prospects of the Argentinean political, economic and so-
cial system seemed to be quite favourable in the mid-1990s. This
is largely due to the economic transformation policy initiated by the
Menem government.
When Carlos Saul Menem of the Justicialist National
Movement - also known as the Peronist Party - became President
in 1989, he started to restructure the economy fundamentally.
Privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of the economy were
on top of the government's agenda. In April 1991, the government
launched the so-called Convertibility Plan, tying the Argentinean
Peso to the US-Dollar at pari (i.e. 1:1). The very intention was to
stop hyperinflation, reduce the public debt, promote economic growth
and limit state domination of the economic system13. The government
liberalized trade and restructured the economy in order to re-establish
confidence, both in the government and in the economy (Hujo,
2001;OECD, 1997a; World Bank, 2000).
The new economic policy quickly took effect. Argentina
experienced strong economic growth and low inflation rates in the
1990s (see Table 1 and 5). As soon as 1992, the annual inflation
rate was down to 24.9 per cent - a historically low figure. Two
years later, in 1994 prices rose by just 4.2 per cent. Thus, the
government succeeded in ending hyperinflation. Consequently, to
most Argentines   as well as  international creditors and advisers
-especially of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-, the
future looked promising in economic terms.
13 The plan goes back to the former  minister of economy Domingo Cavallo. Cavallo
re-scheduled internal and external debt and started to reform the fiscal and monetary
system.
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However, there was one major concern that remained, namely
the chronic budget deficit. In the first years of his presidency,
Menem actually succeeded in reducing the overall budget deficit.
The Federal Government's fiscal deficit declined from an average
of about 6 to 8 percent of GDP for most of the 1980s to a slight
surplus of 0.6 per cent of GDP in 1992 (Table 3). However, as
soon as 1994, the balance became negative again.
The negative development of the balance in the mid-1990s
partly goes back to increasing popular pressures over pending pension
claims, the government eventually was forced to yield to. As a
result, the financial stability of the Social Security budget was
shaken again. For example, in 1994, the government was obliged
to spend 1.3 billion US-Dollars in subsidies to cover deficits flowing
from retrospective pensions, ordered by judicial rulings, for 100,000
recipients (Sennholz, 2002).
III.3. The new Argentinean crisis since the late 1990s
The fiscal debt turned out to be the major problem of the
Argentinean economy. Interest payments on the government debt
rose while the government failed to repay its liabilities. Therefore,
even though Argentina is one of the countries in Latin America
with the highest per capita income during that time, and even
though international institutions continuously praised the country
for its economic policy since 1991, Argentina is now on the brink
of ruin again since the late 1990s. There are various reasons for
this bad economic performance. Some of them go back to external
shocks, some of them are due to domestic policies.
a. External shocks
Just one year after the pension reform, the stability of the
economic system was put to a test. Due to the devaluation of the
Mexican peso in 1994 (Diciembre), the Argentinean economy
shrank by 2.8 percent in the same year. However, this was just a
temporary setback. The following year, Argentina's GDP growth
The Argentinean Pension System - prior and after reform 233
rates were positive once again. One year later, in 1997, real GDP
growth rates amounted to 8.1 per cent. Therefore, the economic
background on which the reformed pension system operated was
quite favourable - at least in the first few years.
Yet, the next wave of successive economic shocks hit Ar-
gentina hard. Following the Russian crisis in 1998 and the subsequent
turbulence in international financial markets, Argentina steered
straight into a recession in the fourth quarter of 1998. In 1999, the
economy experienced a contraction of 3.4 percent of GDP. One
year later, annual growth rates plunged by another 0.6 per cent of
GDP. The situation got worse in 2001 when annual growth rates
dropped again at about 3.8 per cent of GDP. The devaluation of
the Brazilian currency and unfavourable weather conditions
accelerated the downward spiral of economic growth14. The situation
turned from bad to worse. Eventually, Argentina fell back into
economic crisis and returned to its history of rising inflation rates
and unemployment, negative growth rates and mounting fiscal
problems.
b. Domestic problems and politics
Domestic - especially political factors - contributed to the
difficult economic state. In the second half of 1999, uncertainty
over the presidential elections further complicated the situation. In
October 1999 Fernando de la Rúa won the elections to Argentine
presidency. In order to deal with the increasing economic problems
the new president levied new taxes and reduced public spending
(Sennholz, 2002). Yet, the economic prospects remained critical.
Unemployment rose from 13.7 percent in October 1999 to 15.4
percent in May the following year (World Bank, 2000). When
14 As Brazil was Argentina’s most important trading partner, exports from Argentina
became relatively expensive. This was a major blow to the export industry. It is important
to note that Argentina - besides Hong Kong - was the only country that did not devaluate
its currency since 1991 (Argentinisches Tageblatt, May 4, 2002).
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international creditors and organisations called for fiscal
consolidation, the population became alarmed because they feared
further austerity-programs.
When the Minister of Economy José Luis Machinea resigned
in March 2001, his successor Ricardo López Murphy revealed a
rigid austerity program within the same month. Yet, just a couple
of days after the presentation of his austerity program, he had to
quit because of furious protest over his policies. Domingo Cavallo,
who had been in office before from 1991 to 1996, became new
Minister of Economy and quickly presented a new strategy in order
to settle economic turbulences15. At the end of July 2001, the
government passed its major austerity bills with the intention to end
budget deficits. It implied cuts in state salaries and pension benefits
by up to 13 per cent. Again, this policy met with fierce resistance
of the people. Workers were afraid to fall into poverty and retirees
saw their pensions diminish or even lost altogether. The situation
escalated even further and nearly got out of control. When the
unions called general strikes, millions of workers paralyzed the
economy by blocking highways, disrupting transportation, closing
schools, and damaging business property. Because the people did
not trust the government or the financial market any longer, they
withdraw huge amounts of money from their bank accounts that
amounted to about 1.3 billion US-Dollars a day in November 2001.
As a result, on the 1st of December the  Minister of the Economy
announces restrictions on the amount of money the public is allowed
to withdraw. When the government froze all bank accounts to
protect the banks from breakdown shortly before Christmas 2001,
the situation escalated. Peaceful as well as violent protests spread
all over the country. In addition, the 2002 budget plan that was
presented by the government in mid-December implied spending
cuts of nearly 20 per cent. On December 19th Argentina declared
15 One of his main targets was a zero-deficit policy to lower the mounting fiscal deficit,
which already had piled up a sum of 2.5 billion US-Dollars in the second half of 2001 (Priess
2001a).
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a state of emergency to stop opposition to its plans. When riots
spread and more than 20 people died during demonstrations,
President de la Rua just after being two years in office and Minister
of Economy Cavallo resigned on  December 20 - 2001, leaving the
economy in worse shape than ever. Adolfo Rodriguez Saa became
president. However, Saa quit just after being eight days in office.
Congress replaced him with Eduardo Duhalde of the Peronist party.
In 2002, price increases speeded up again. In April 2002
consumer prises rose (compared to April 2001) at a rate of 21.1
per cent16. At the same time, no emergency and austerity plan that
was implemented by successive economic ministers took effect.
Rather, these measures contributed to an already aggravated
situation.
IV. THE REASONS FOR PENSION REFORM
IV.1. Structural deficits of the old pension scheme
The pre-1994 pension system had major structural drawbacks.
First of all, it was highly fragmented and consisted of multiple
funds. Every fund had different kinds of legislation and organisation,
benefits, and contribution rates. The result was efficiency losses
and high costs as well as problems of inequality between different
groups of the insured. Secondly, entitlement conditions were quite
permissive. People could receive full pensions after 15 years of
contribution-payments. The official retirement age was
comparatively low. The minimum retirement age for women was
55 years and 60 years for men. As the three highest salaries of the
last ten years of employment were used as basis to calculate the
resulting benefit, employers often granted profound salary increases
16 The main reason for this new inflationary pressure is the devaluation of the peso,
to which the government resorted in January 2002. As the Argentinean Peso was closely
tied to the US-Dollar since 1991, the turn to a more or less floating exchange rate hit the
economy particularly hard. Within three month, the Peso was traded 3:1 to the US-Dollar
(Argentinisches Tageblatt, May 11 2002).
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at the end of working life. On the other hand, underreporting of
income was usual. Altogether, it led to high losses in contribution
revenues (Queisser, 1998).
In the 1980s, the Argentine pension system deteriorated, as
the balance of the pension system worsened. In 1991, the deficit
of the social security scheme already amounted to 0.72 per cent of
GDP. The negative balance increased to 1.47 per cent of GDP in
1994 (Table 6).
Table 6
Financial Situation of the old pension system in Argentina in % of GDP
(1991-1994)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Contribution revenues 3.06 3.51 3.73 3.45
Expenditures 3.78 4.45 4.80 4.92
Balance -0.72 -0.94 -1.07 -1.47
Source: Vittas, 1997, p. 15.
At the same time, social expenditures were high. Besides the
low retirement ages and resulting longer periods of pension payment,
replacement rates were generous. The government promised
relatively high pension benefits and a replacement rate of 70 to 82
per cent of previous earnings17. Even the relatively high contribution
rates of 27 per cent of gross wage were not sufficient to provide
for a stable financial basis of the pension scheme18. In 1990, the
average replacement rates fell to 40 per cent. As a result, people
lost faith in the government and the pension system (Vittas, 1997,
p. 3). When the contribution-benefit linkage turned weaker and
weaker, a growing number of people evaded contribution payments.
In 1990, the estimated rate of evasion amounted to 46 per cent of
workers who were eligible for the pension system. It increased
17 Replacement rates were even higher for privileged groups like high rank civil servants
(Hujo, 2001).
18 From 1985-1991 state subsidies amounted to 20 to 30 per cent of benefit payments
(Hujo, 2001).
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further and reached an estimated 57 per cent in 1995 (Cf. ibid., p.
17). Thus, even during the expansion of employment during the
economic upswing in the early 1990s, reported employment to the
social security scheme lagged behind19. As a result of rising
unemployment rates and increasing contribution evasion, the financial
basis of the social security scheme is further weakened.
IV.2. The economic and political context
As already mentioned earlier, the pension reform was a logical
result of the economic crisis in the 1980s and the restructuring of
the Argentinean economy in the 1990s. The new policy under the
Peronist prime minister Carlos Menem has been called a "neoliberal
turn" as he favoured market solutions to state intervention and
regulation (Hujo, 2001). The main implications are twofold. Firstly,
because of the Convertibility Plan, the implicit dept of the pension
system became explicit20. Eventually it turned out that the pension
system had piled up a negative balance of 12 billion US-Dollars
(Hujo, 2001). As a first step to lessen the debt burden, the new
Menem administration issued long-term pension bonds. Furthermore,
the government spent 4.5 million US-Dollar of privatisation revenue
of the national petroleum company to balance the deficit at least
in parts (World Bank, 1996). This emergency measure however
was a short-time reaction. A structural reform of the social security
system that would address the underlying problems of the financial
instability was considered as being necessary. Thus, secondly, the
financial crisis in the 1980s paved the way for an agreement on
fundamental reforms of the pension scheme.
19 For example, between October 1998 and October 1999 the number of employed
people increased by about 1.7 per cent whereas the number of employees reported to the
social security administration had been lower in the third quarter of 1999 than the year
before. This is an indicator for a growing informal sector and thus contribution evasion
(ECLAC, 2000, p. 144).
20 The implicit pension debt in 1990 in Argentina was among the highest in Latin
America and mounted to an estimated 305 per cent of GDP (Bravo/Uthoff, 1999, p. 11).
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The Argentinean pension system was in dire need for reform,
as it was "technically insolvent prior to its radical reform" (Vittas,
1997, p. 11). The pension system was expensive and increasingly
dependent on state subsidies. In addition, the system was mature, as
it operated since 1944 and gradually included almost the entire working
population21 (Queisser, 1998).
IV.3. The long-term perspective: Demographic projections
While macroeconomic circumstances are crucial for the ability
of the people to contribute to the pension scheme, the financial stability
of a pension scheme is largely determined by demographic factors.
The demographic situation was quite favourable in the 1990s. Still,
rising life expectancy (Figure 1) and declining birth rates (Figure 2)
were already observable.
Figure 1
Development and projection of life expectancy at birth in Argentina
(1950 to 2050) in years
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21 General Peron is largely responsible for universality of the Argentinean social
security system. Until 1944, just seven percent of the population was covered by social
protection. However, step-by-step Peron integrated all workers – including urban as well
as agricultural workers, the self-employed and civil servants into the pension system
(Hujo, 2001, p. 3).
Source: Own presentation based on ECLAC (2002a)
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Figure 2
Development and projection of the Total Fertility rates* in Argentina
(1950 to 2050)
Source: Own presentation based on ECLAC (2002a)
These two factors are the main long-term challenge for the
pension system in particular and state finances in general. When
fewer children are born and people live longer, this causes a rising
old age dependency rate (OADR). OADR measures the ratio of
the people aged 65 and above in relation to the working age
population (people aged 15-64). This relation describes the age
structure within a country and is especially important in respect to
public social security expenditures (Table 7). Because of the rising
old age dependency rate, more and more people have - and will
have - pension claims.
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Table 7
Projected Old Age Dependency Rate* in Argentina in % (selected years:
1950 to 2050)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
OADR 6,4 8,6 11,0 13,2 14,7 15,5 15,9 17,6 19,9 22,9 28,5
* OADR (Old Age Dependency Ratio) = Population aged 65 and above in per cent of population aged 15-64
Source: Own calculation based on ECLAC (2002a).
V. THE SITUATION OF THE PENSIONERS
V.1. During the economic crisis in the 1980s and prior to
pension reform
Taking the above mentioned structural deficits of the old
pension scheme as well as macroeconomic problems into account,
it was inevitable that sooner or later the government would fail to
pay pension benefits. As inflation increased, the government missed
to adjust benefits to inflation because of budgetary pressures. As
a result, real pensions continued to drop until their level reached
"politically and socially unsustainable dimensions" (Hujo, 2001). Real
pension benefits were not sufficient to protect the old from becoming
poor. In 1986, the government announced a state of social security
emergency. It levied new taxes on fuel, telephone services, and
gas to finance the pension system. In the meantime, the government
faced increasing pressure from the population. Argentinean
pensioners took legal action against the government because pensions
dropped to levels well below the statutory replacement rate. To
ease the pressure from the population, the government re-negotiated
the calculation base in order to pay outstanding pensions. Yet, the
emergency measures just improved the situation temporarily. After
lifting the state of emergency, problems popped up again. By the
end of the 1980s, the Argentine pension system was insolvent (Cf.
ibid.).
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V.2. During the phase of economic recovery and after pension
reform 1994-1999
From a welfare perspective, one undesirable tendency since
the pension reform is the declining rate of effective coverage from
54 per cent of eligible workers in 1990 to 42 per cent five years
later. Additionally, there is an increasing share of non-contributing
affiliates to the overall pension scheme, i.e. both the first and the
second layer. In 1990, 4.89 million people contributed to the pension
scheme. Five years later - one year after the new pension scheme
was implemented - there were only 4.18 million affiliates who paid
contributions. Thus, the System Dependency Ratio (SDR)22  which
measures the relation of beneficiaries to contributors declined from
64.0 per cent in 1990 to 49.4 per cent in 1995 (Vittas, 1997, p. 17).
This is an alarming development - not only for the fiscal budget but
especially for the pensioners. Queisser already warned in 1998
"[t]he increasing share of non-contributing affiliates jeopardises the
effectiveness of the new pension system in providing old-age
security" (Queisser, 1998, p. 21). As most of the non-contributing
affiliates belong to the lower-income groups, they are likely to drop
below the poverty line when they retire. Additionally, these figures
indicate that many affiliates will not complete the necessary
contribution period in order to receive a minimum pension.
Financial problems remained oppressive because contributions
to the pension scheme became less (see Table 6). Shortly after the
pension reform, the authorities decided to cut pensions by changing
the benefit formula according to budgetary needs (Vittas, 1997, p.
3). In March 1995 the Argentinean government introduced the law
on Pension Solidarity (Law, 24463), which implied that pension
benefits are no longer automatically indexed but subject to ad-hoc
decisions by the government. Two years later, the government
22 The System Dependency Rate (SDR) is a good indicator for the financial equilibrium
of a pension system. When the number of contributors decreases – or even remains
unchanged – while the number of beneficiaries increases, this relation will rise. In a PAYG-
scheme it means that the burden on the employed increases as they have to finance the
benefits of an increasing number of pensioners.
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substituted AMPO with MOPRE to calculate retirement benefits (see
Section II). Therefore, the effective replacement rates now depend on
annual budgetary considerations. Furthermore, the 1995 Pension
Solidarity Law provides for greater distribution in the public scheme,
as it favours low level pensions over higher pension claims. The main
intention of this measure was to limit costs of public pensions.
Vittas regarded the law as "a necessary measure for reducing
the burden of past pensions". Yet, one problematic feature of the
Pension Solidarity Law is that pension payments are subject to arbitrary
decisions by the government.
V.3. During the new economic crisis since the late 1990s
In order to stop increases in social security expenditure the
state resorted to further measures that entail arbitrary rulings depending
on the financial situation of the state budget. When economic
turbulences set in again in 1998, pensioners were affected along with
the whole population. In July 2001, pension benefits were cut by 13
per cent when the government issued its austerity plan in order to
reduce the budget deficit. On December 6 2001, Minister of Economy
Cavallo launched an emergency measure to avoid the government's
failure to pay 130 billion Dollar public debt. He transformed the country's
pension funds into treasury bonds or government backed loans in
order to service fiscal debts. This provoked protests of the already
hostile electorate. In 2002, pension payments became chaotic. People
were queuing outside banks, post offices, and police stations in order
to get their pensions23 (Argentinisches Tageblatt, April 27, 2002). This
upheaval goes back to the severe situation of the pensioners. In April
2002, for more than half of all 3.2 million pensioners monthly benefits
amounted to less than 300 pesos24 (El Cronista, April 26, 2002).
23 In Argentina, pensions are only paid in cash.
24 Monthly pension payments are distributed (in per cent of all beneficiaries) as
follows: Up to 150 pesos 17.4 per cent; 150 to 300 pesos: 50.6 per cent; 300 to 500 pesos:
15.3 per cent; 500 to 1000 pesos: 11.4 per cent; 1000 to 2000 pesos: 4.5 per cent; more
than 2000 pesos: 0.7 per cent (El Cronista, 26 April 2002).
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VI. THE ARGENTINEAN PENSION SYSTEM AFTER REFORM
Early experience with the new pension scheme indicate that
the reformer's expectations were largely too optimistic. Some of
the predicted advantages did not materialize. One practical
explanation is the adverse economic situation since the late 1990s.
Yet, there may be some problematic features in the structural
design of the new pension scheme.
VI.1. The development of the Public Scheme
The very intention of the reform was to solve the problem of
ever-increasing budget deficits in the retirement scheme. Yet,
despite the pension reform, welfare costs remain a heavy financial
burden for the state. Since the 1994-reform, the state is responsible
for numerous different retirement benefits. This includes the payment
of the Basic Universal Benefit (PBU), the Compensatory Benefits
(PC), and the payment of non-contributory pensions25 . Yet, while
the Old System Pension and the Compensatory Pensions are just
transitory, they represent a profound financial obligation at least in
the short run. Thus, from a fiscal perspective, the reform implies
problematic transitory features. In addition, as parts of the old
system remain in place the government is still financing the old,
extremely expensive pension scheme. It is no wonder that the
reform did not put an end to the increasing budget deficit. To the
contrary, total pension spending grew steadily. As a result, the pre-
reform dilemma remained after the reform: The government is
forced to reduce the federal government deficit, while liabilities
increase even further.
The prospects of the reformed system do not seem to be too
glorious. Firstly, the benign economic circumstances of the mid-
1990s did not last long. Secondly, fiscal costs will increase due to
the transition from the old to the new pension scheme at least in
25 These non-contributory pensions are special retirement regimes financed out of tax
revenues. They are granted to employees of the Armed Forces, the Security personnel,
the Foreign Ministry, the Legislative Branch and the Judiciary.
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the first years of operation. Thirdly, long-term problems of an ageing
society are already looming.
Because of the expected and already occurring transition
costs of national pension reform, neither expenditures nor the budget
deficit did decline as expected. Some authors even claim the pension
reform itself contributed to the dilemma of ever-increasing budget
deficits and increasing pension liabilities while contribution revenues
decline. Critics like the economist Mark Weisbrot see the pension
reform as one part of the economic problems that set in again at
the end of the 1990s (Bussey, 2002). This is because the
privatization of the social security system obliges the federal
government to spend more than one percent of its budget each
year26. As parts of the contributions are channelled into the private
pension plans instead of going into the PAYG scheme, the
government has to pay pensions to recent pensioners out of a
shrinking PAYG social security budget. Additionally, the Old System
Pensions (OSP) transfers the problems of the past system to the
new pension scheme. The most problematic inheritance was a very
high system dependency ratio because of widespread evasion, low
retirement ages, lax eligibility rules, and high targeted - however
most of the time not achieved - replacement rates (Vittas, 1997,
pp.14-16). The situation got worse because of the recession in
Argentina since 1999. While the government has to find new sources
of funding for pensions, contribution payment break away and thus
increase the debt even further (Figure 5).
After the pension reform, benefit payments did not decrease
but increased while at the same time contribution payments became
less. Admittedly, reformers had expected this.  Yet,  the
transformation costs had been projected under rather optimistic
assumptions - for example an initial ratio between contributors and
affiliates of 65 per cent was expected to rise to 95 per cent within
the first years after pension reform. According to the projection of
government economists, the public layer pillar would accumulate a
26 Transitional fiscal costs of pension reform are more or less manageable depending on
the inherited size of the debt, demographic and macroeconomic factors, the reform path and
the transitional regulations.
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deficit until 2013. After that time, they predicted a growing surplus
the following years (Vittas 1997, p. 22). Thus, at least in the first
years, the partial privatisation of pension insurance had adverse
effects on fiscal balance. This might not have been too problematic,
if Argentina had a safe financial background27.
The relatively good shape of the Argentinean economy in the
early 1990s was not good enough to finance the costs arising from
the transition of the old to the new pension scheme. In addition, the
Argentinean government did not succeed in creating sustainable
financial space in the state budget in the second half of the 1990s.
The Russian crisis in 1998 aggravated the unfortunate situation.
Yet, the deathblow was the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
in 1999. Eventually the government found itself with largely no
sources left to finance the pension system. The country has
practically run out of state companies to sell (Gill, 2002).
Furthermore, tax receipts plunged at about 7.4 per cent from March
2001 to March 2002; VAT-revenues fell during that time at about
27.2 per cent and income tax fell at about 34.6 per cent (Birdsall,
2002; Priess, 2002). As unemployment increases, rises many people
fell beneath the poverty line and therefore could not contribute to
the social security scheme28. Still, the government has to provide
27 In 1997, Vittas was still optimistic that the transformation costs could be managed,
as “the projected deficit of the public pillar appears financiable in the new environment of
macrostability and growing fiscal markets” (Ibid., p. 23). Even in 1999, the French political
scientist Alain Touraine stated that prospects for economic recovery and economic growth
in Argentina were very good – especially in comparison to other Latin-American countries.
To his mind, the country did succeed in passing all reforms necessary to be able to deal with
future social challenges (Priess 1999). From what we know now, this was a complete
misinterpretation of the situation. But they cannot be blamed for this optimistic judgement
as during that time Argentina’s economic prospects did not look too bad.
28 Additionally, the new pension scheme does not seem to be attractive to self-employed.
According to recent studies, out of 4.8 million self-employed in Argentina 3.2 million are
affiliated either to the public or to the private pension scheme. However, only 10 per cent
of the self-employed affiliates contributed to one of the schemes of the second layer. This
figure means a sharp decrease compared to previous years. Whereas in 1994, 1.3 million self-
employed joined either the private or the public alternative of the second layer, in 1999 there
were just 700,000 of them left. This relatively low figure may be caused by the relatively high
contribution rate of 27 per cent for the self-employed (Hujo, 2001).
246 Angelika Bucerius
benefits. As a consequence there is an increasing discrepancy
between contributions and benefits (Figure 3).
The irony of the situation according to critics is that the
pension reform program was especially pushed forward by
institutions - like the IMF and the World Bank - that now urge the
government to cut the fiscal debt. This however might lead to
further cuts in public pension benefits and resulting poverty among
the elderly (Bussey, 2002).
Figure 3
Social Security Contributions and Benefits in Argentina in million
Pesos (1993 to 2001)
 
VI.2. The private layer (AFJP)
As expected prior to reform an increasing part of the working
population would opt for the private pension scheme. Yet, in the
early days of pension reform in July 1994, no more than 1.8 million
workers were affiliated to one of the AFJPs. However, the pace
of affiliation to the AFJPs speeded up within a short period of
time. As soon as March 1995, around 3.7 million workers joined
the private pension scheme. In the following years, the private
Source: Own calculation based on Secretariat of the Treasury (Ministry of Economy)
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alternative attracted more and more people. Within three years,
the figure of affiliates had almost doubled to 6.5 million in March
1998. In early 2001, the second layer - i.e. the private plus the
public alternative - counted over eleven million affiliates. Most of
them (78 per cent of all insured) were affiliated with the private
alternative (Hujo, 2001). In March 2002, the number of affiliates
had accelerated to more than 8.9 million.
However, this supposed story of success needs to be seen
with one important qualification. Taking the numbers of active
contributors to the AFJPs into account, there is another story to
tell. Whereas the number of affiliates has increased steadily, the
number of contributors firstly always lagged behind and secondly,
decreased in absolute and relative terms since 1999 (Figure 4).
The reasons for this might be found in the economic slowdown
since the late 1990s but as well in an increasing rate of evasion.
It had been largely expected that the privatisation of the pension
system would mean higher compliance. This however might have
been a fallacy.
Figure 4
Social Security Contributors and Affiliates in Argentina
 Source: Own calculation and presentation based on SAFJP
248 Angelika Bucerius
Therefore, the relation of affiliates to active contributors
worsened (Figure 5). Therefore, high evasion rates are an important
and escalating problem of the private alternative as well.
Figure 5
Active contributors in relation to affiliates of the AFJP in Argentina
(March 1995- March 2002) in per cent
VI.3. Development of the pension fund market
Since 1994, the pension fund market underwent a process of
concentration. When the new pension scheme was implemented,
25 pension fund companies offered pension schemes. In March
2002, there were just 12 left. These 12 pension funds accumulated
24 billion pesos in March 2002, which is equivalent to 9 per cent
of GDP. The four largest pension fund providers accounted for 76
per cent of all funds and affiliates in March 2002. The fluctuation
between the pension fund companies has decreased slightly in
200229. From March 2001 to March 2002, 411,000 people swapped
the company.
29 Affiliates are allowed to switch the pension fund company twice a year. However,
they have to contribute at least four times to the pension provider they are leaving.
Source: Own calculation and presentation based on SAFJP
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Table 8
Performance of Fully Funded Scheme in Argentina 1996, 2001 and
2002
June 1996 July 2001 March 2002
Affiliation
- number of insured persons 5.4 Mio 8.7 Mio 8.9 Mio
- contributors 2.7 Mio 3.3 Mio 2,7 Mio
Effective rate of contributors 51% 38% 30%
Market structure
- number of administrators 21 13 12
- concentration (affiliates in first 4 AFJP) 52% 73% 76%
administration costs (% salary) 2.6% 1.97% 2,26 %
insurance fee 0.7% 1.4% 0,53 %
Volume of funds $ 3.839 Mio $ 21.000 Mio $ 24,000 Mio
- accumulated funds/GDP 1.4% 7% 9%
Average real rate of return 22.8% 9.9% 9,3 %
 (1994-1996)  (1994-2001)  (1994-2002)
Sources: Hujo, 2001; SAFJP.
The accumulated annual rates of return varied profoundly.
Between March 2001 and March 2002, there was a negative rate
of return of -4.3 per cent. In the previous period there had been
a slightly positive rate of 1 per cent, whereas between March 1999
and March 2000 the rate amounted to 22.4 per cent. The lowest
rate yet had been achieved between March 1998 and March 1999
(-6.1 per cent). The highest rates were reached between March
1995 and March 1996 (25.6 per cent). However, these nominal
rates or returns do not take commission rates and the inflation rate
into account. Especially because of rising prices since early 2002,
real rates of return are likely to become negative (Hujo, 2001;
SAFJP; Vittas, 1997).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is not easy to judge the reformed pension system in Ar-
gentina, while the economy is caught in a recession. Any pension
system - whether it is a well constructed one or not - will struggle
in such harsh economic circumstances. Furthermore, the most
crucial test, namely whether the system turns out to be viable and
stable in the long-term, has not started yet. One key issue due to
the special design of the new pension system is likely to become
the payment of the compensatory pensions (PC) due to an expected
increase in life expectancy. As demographic projections have
demonstrated, the major challenge of an ageing society is about to
come in the next decades . Therefore, even if expectations have
not been met and the reformed pension system is in such a bad
shape as 2002 it is too early to condemn it outright.
Accordingly, this paper firstly accounted for the reasons for
pension reform and secondly described the development of the
new pension scheme. However, some observations are quite
interesting and thus offer lessons to learn from. It has been shown
that the pension reform in Argentina was primarily motivated by
short-term problems. Ironically, since the late 1990s the new pension
scheme faces almost the same temporary problems as the old
scheme. The disastrous shape of the Argentinean economy has
negative effects on the social security system. These effects led
to modifications of benefit calculation and benefit cuts. Moreover,
economic problems are largely responsible for the fact that the
Argentinean government does not manage to finance the transition
period. As a consequence, financial short-term problems are more
serious than anticipated.
The additional demographic burden will come along gradually
but will hit the pension scheme especially hard if the economy does
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not recover. So first of all, the economy needs to be consolidated.
Until that time, the government will not be able to make any
amendments of the pension scheme in order to improve compliance,
to secure sufficient pension benefits or to reconsider some
unfavourable elements. Structural deficits of the new pension system
are the relatively low retirement age for women and the high
minimum-contribution years. The retirement age for women should
be increased because of the projected ageing of the society. On
the other hand, the increased minimum-contribution years seem to
lead to even less compliance instead of fighting evasion as actually
intended. Furthermore, due to the tightening of this eligibility
criterion, the formerly high coverage of the elderly dwindles and
leaves more and more people without old age security. For that
reason, the minimum-contribution rates ought to be reduced.
Considering everything, it becomes obvious that many of the
reformer's expectations have not been met. Evasion has not
decreased but increased, the pension scheme is not prone to state
interventions and the financial burden exceeds the most negative
expectations and seems to be greater than before. At the present,
Argentina is not even able to cope with anticipated short-term
problems like financing the transition period. Therefore, it remains
to be seen whether the new pension system is capable of facing
future problems.
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